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INTRODUCTION
According to some recent reports, global cobalt supplies are less than
10 years away from running out.1 Demand for cobalt has surged in recent
years due to rapid growth in battery production for electric vehicles and
utility-scale energy storage.2 Although it would technically be possible to
replace cobalt with certain other minerals in most energy storage products,
all known substitutes for the mineral would substantially reduce batteries’
efficiency and would require that they be fitted with costly cooling
systems.3
Unfortunately, cobalt is not the only mineral at risk of shortage as the
demand for renewable energy and energy storage grows; market supplies
of multiple other essential battery minerals such as lithium are at risk of
depleting to troublingly low levels.4 Critical minerals (“CM”) serve
important functions in a broad array of widely-used products, from
smartphones to automobiles. The United States (“U.S.”) federal
government has expressly recognized cobalt and lithium as “critical
1. Nathanial Gronewold, Deep-sea Miners See Tesla Growth as Signal to
Pluck Cobalt, E&E NEWS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1062004431 [https://perma.cc/3FB4-6W8D] (refers to the estimated current
supply of terrestrial cobalt).
2. Id.
3. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, at 51
(2019), https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production
/atoms/files/mcs2019_all.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN72-DUBU]
[hereinafter
MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019].
4. Guy Burdick, Battery Makers Face Looming Shortages of High-Quality
Lithium, UTILITYDIVE (June 25, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/battery
-makers-face-looming-shortages-of-high-quality-lithium/580482/ [https://perma
.cc/BV5C-V28R].
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minerals” essential to national security and economic stability.5 However,
many CM are also crucial to the global decarbonization effort because they
are essential inputs in wind turbines, solar panels, and grid-scale battery
storage.
The growing demand for CM has driven dramatic increases in their
mining and production in recent decades, and those trends are likely to
continue in the coming years. Worldwide lithium production catapulted
from around 6,200 tons annually in 1993 to 91,000 tons in 2019 due to
increases in demand.6 Currently, battery production makes up 65% of
annual global lithium use.7 Increasingly, these lithium-ion batteries are
finding their way into the world’s growing fleet of hybrid and electric
vehicles. For instance, a modern Toyota Prius’ electric battery contains
more than 20 pounds of lithium—an enormous amount considering the
rarity of the mineral.8 Automakers sold 770,000 electric vehicles in China
and 200,000 electric vehicles in the U.S. in 2017,9 and Amazon alone
placed an order for 100,000 electric vehicles in September 2019.10 Lithium
demand is projected to increase to 1.3 million metric tons by 2025, driven
primarily by continued demand for batteries for uses like grid storage and
electric cars.11 In addition to lithium, other CM associated with battery and
5. Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,835 (Dec. 26, 2017); see also
Gronewold, supra note 1.
6. JOYCE A. OBER, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
LITHIUM 4 (1994), https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/prd-wret/assets/pallad
ium/production/mineral-pubs/lithium/450494.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWK3-22TW];
MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 99.
7. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2020, at
98 (2020), https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020.pdf [https://per
ma. cc/EH2G-93K4].
8. Andrew W. Eichner, More Precious Than Gold: Limited Access to Rare
Elements and Implications for Clean Energy in the United States, 2012 U. ILL. J.
L. TECH. & POL’Y 257, 262.
9. HJ Mai, To Compete in the Global Battery Arms Race, the U.S. Must Spur
its Domestic Market, Analysts Say, UTILITYDIVE (June 24, 2019), https://www.
utilitydive.com/news/creating-a-domestic-market-is-paramount-for-us-battery-in
dustry-to-close-th/557339/ [https://perma.cc/9KLE-C3H9].
10. Ernest Scheyder, Miners Push for U.S. Congress to Vote on Electric
Vehicle Supply Chain Bills, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-mining-strategicminerals/miners-push-for-u-s-congress-to-vote-on
-electric-vehicle-supply-chain-bills-idU.S.KBN1W81ST
[https://perma.cc/CS3C-6CCM].
11. James Ellsmoor, Electric Vehicles Are Driving Demand for Lithium With Environmental Consequences, FORBES (June 10, 2019, 5:46 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jamesellsmoor/2019/06/10/electric-vehicles-are-driving-
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renewable energy production such as cobalt and certain rare-earth
elements are likewise expected to experience skyrocketing demand that
could potentially outstrip available supplies.
Meeting the global economy’s burgeoning demand for CM is
presenting ever-more significant challenges because of the tremendous
scarcity of these minerals. For instance, lithium only makes up 0.002% of
the Earth’s crust, amounting to a global mineral reserve of 62 million
tons.12 Even if lithium demand plateaus at 1.3 million tons per year, less
than a 60-year supply exists.13 Known supplies of multiple other CM are
likewise severely limited.14
Within U.S. borders, the rapidly increasing demand for CM is causing
many mining companies to search for new ways to increase domestic CM
mine production. For example, the Mountain Pass rare-earth mine in
California became operational again in 2018 after several years of
inactivity.15 Unfortunately, that mine is capable of supplying only a small
fraction of the U.S.’s CM requirements.16 Piedmont Lithium Limited
likewise recently applied for permits to reopen a lithium mine 25 miles
outside of Charlotte, North Carolina.17 However, the North Carolina mine
possesses only a 13-year production supply at current demand rates, and
that timetable is likely to only get shorter as domestic lithium demand
increases.18 Senators from coal mining regions have even been pushing for
legislation to support the extraction of certain CM from coal, although the
potential benefits of that strategy are also limited.19

demand-for-lithium-with-environmental-consequences/#7a6f270862e2 [https://
perma.cc/YRX2-7Z8L].
12. Carolyn Gramling, The Search for New Geologic Sources of Lithium
Could Power a Clean Future, SCIENCENEWS (May 7, 2019), https://www.
sciencenews.org/article/search-new-geologic-sources-lithium-could-power-clean
-future [https://perma.cc/M497-Z6CA].
13. This number was derived from taking the estimated lithium reserve of 62
million tons from Gramling, supra note 12, and dividing it by the estimated
lithium demand of 1.3 million tons/year from Scheyder, supra note 10.
14. Ellsmoor, supra note 11.
15. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 132.
16. Id.
17. Bruce Henderson, NC was once a top source of lithium. Growing demand
could lead to a mine near Charlotte, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 2, 2019)
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/article228475629.html [https:
//perma.cc/XV83-NWSX].
18. Id.
19. Rare Earth Element Advanced Coal Technologies Act, S. 1052, 116th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2019); see also Scheyder, supra note 10.
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Efforts to increase supplies of CM are hampered in part by concerns
about the environmental risks and social costs of mining for these
minerals.20 Terrestrial mining of CM such as lithium, cobalt, and rare-earth
elements tends to be relatively inexpensive but often threatens
environmental and human health. For instance, lithium mining pollution
in Tibet was recently blamed for causing fish and a yak in a local river to
go belly up.21 Lithium mining in Chile is depleting groundwater resources,
depriving local communities of an essential resource.22 Rare-earth element
mines across China have stripped topsoil from valleys and pumped
thousands of gallons of acid into streams.23 California’s Mountain Pass
rare-earth element mine leaked radioactive fluid into neighboring land.24
Furthermore, a recent investigation estimated that 35,000 children are
working in cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.25 In
light of all of these problems, alternatives to terrestrial mining are needed
to help minimize the societal costs of supplying these CM while still
furthering the global transition to renewable energy.
This Article highlights the deficiencies in existing U.S. policies related
to CM production and ultimately advocates for specific policy changes
capable of helping the country usher in an era of responsible CM security.
These policy changes, designed to more aggressively promote domestic
CM production and research into CM-alternative technologies could do
much to strengthen the nation’s long-term national security, economic
growth, and divestment from fossil fuels.
Part I of this Article describes CM and the key factors in their
production, examines ongoing international trade issues involving them,
and highlights the essential roles CM play in the renewable energy and
energy storage industries. Part II reviews the U.S. Government’s existing
efforts to incentivize CM and identifies certain shortcomings of these
approaches. Part III recommends specific policy strategies for
20. Keith Bradsher, After China's Rare Earth Embargo, a New Calculus,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/business/
global/30rare.html [https://perma.cc/NR2D-LA7D].
21. Amit Katwala, The spiraling environmental cost of our lithium battery
addiction, WIRED (Aug. 5, 2018) https://www.wired.co.uk/article/lithiumbatteries-environment-impact [https://perma.cc/GN4Y-JE39].
22. Id.
23. Bradsher, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Siddharth Kara, Is Your Phone Tainted by the Misery of the 35,000
Children in the Congo’s Mines?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2018) https://www
.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/12/phone-misery-children-congocobalt-mines-drc [https://perma.cc/F4QB-UAXQ].
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incentivizing deep-sea mining, promoting greater investments in efficient
CM recycling, and otherwise reducing dependence on importations of
CM, and describes how adopting these strategies would address many of
these challenges facing this important industry.
I. THE DIRT ON CRITICAL MINERALS
Today, the U.S. is heavily reliant on imports of at least 35 specific CM
that are essential to the nation’s economic stability and financial security.26
While many of these minerals have been critical for decades, recent
technological advancements and the growing demand for renewable
energy generation have driven a subset of them to the forefront of
concern.27 The following are brief descriptions of these particular minerals
and the reasons for their growing importance to the U.S. economy and to
the transition to a sustainable energy system.
A. Critical Minerals
The federal government has defined critical minerals as “non-fuel
mineral[s] or mineral material[s] essential to the economic and national
security of the U.S. with a supply chain vulnerable to disruption” that
“serve[] an essential function in manufacturing a product.”28 Examples of
minerals falling within this definition include lithium, cobalt, and certain
rare-earth elements.29 As the language of a 2017 federal administrative
order explains, the nation’s dependency on importation of these minerals
“creates a strategic vulnerability for both its economy and military to
adverse foreign government action, natural disaster, and other events that
can disrupt supply of these key minerals.”30
Dozens of commonplace products and materials require CM for their
production. For instance, aluminum, ceramics and glass, lubricating
26. Final List of Critical Minerals 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,295 (May 18, 2018).
27. Id.; see G. Kevin Jones, United States Dependence on Imports of Four
Strategic and Critical Minerals: Implications and Policy Alternatives, 15 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 217, 218 (1988) (“minerals upon which the United States is
dependent for foreign sources of supply, chromium, cobalt, manganese, and
platinum group metals”).
28. Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,835 (Dec. 26, 2017).
29. Final List of Critical Minerals 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,295 (May 18, 2018)
(the seventeen rare-earth elements are cerium, dysprosium, erbium, europium,
gadolinium, holmium, lanthanum, lutetium, neodymium, praseodymium,
promethium, samarium, scandium, terbium, thulium, ytterbium, and yttrium).
30. Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,835 (Dec. 26, 2017).
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grease, and synthetic rubber production use lithium.31 The production of
superalloys for aircraft gas turbine engines requires cobalt.32 Night vision
goggles, glass polish, cellphones, video screens, lasers, and magnets also
incorporate rare-earth elements.33 Importantly, these minerals are also
essential components for the transition to clean energy production because
of their heavy use in renewable energy technologies such as batteries, solar
panels, energy-efficient lighting, and wind turbines.34
B. The Renewables Boom
Renewable energy technologies such as batteries and solar panels
currently depend primarily on supplies of CM produced from terrestrial
mines.35 In 1994, the U.S. Geological Survey predicted that the fate of the
lithium battery market would largely depend on the success of electric
vehicles and whether the best type of battery for powering them is
ultimately a lithium battery.36 This prediction has proven accurate over the
past couple of decades, as annual world lithium production has soared
from approximately 5,600 metric tons in 1994 to 85,000 metric tons in
2018—a 1400% increase.37 Increased battery production has been the
chief driver of this surge. Over half of the annual current world production
of lithium is used in the manufacture of batteries.38
Similar trends of burgeoning demand are likewise affecting markets
for cobalt and certain rare-earth elements due to the heavy use of these
minerals in renewable energy and battery technologies. Annual world
cobalt production has jumped from 19,000 metric tons in 1995 to 140,000
metric tons in 2018,39 with 80% of that production flowing to the
31. OBER, supra note 6, at 1.
32. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MINERAL
COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1996, at 46 (1996) [hereinafter MINERAL COMMODITY
SUMMARIES 1996].
33. Simon Webb, Lisa Shumaker & Jonathan Oatis, U.S. Dependence on
China’s Rare Earth: Trade War Vulnerability, REUTERS (June 27, 2019 3:33PM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-rareearth-explainer/u-s-depend
ence-on-chinas-rare-earth-trade-war-vulnerability-idU.S.KCN1TS3AQ [https://per
ma.cc/3UCY-KLFE].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. OBER, supra note 6, at 3.
37. Id. at 4 (citing MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at
98 (excludes U.S. production)).
38. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 98.
39. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1996, supra note 32, at 47; MINERAL
COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 51.
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manufacture of batteries.40 Rare-earth elements production jumped from
72,000 metric tons in 1995 to 170,000 metric tons in 2018,41 and catalyst
and magnet products like those found in wind turbines account for 41% of
today’s rare-earth element use.42 In short, the pace of the global transition
to sustainable energy hinges on an available and secure supply of these
minerals.
The importance of effective policy making for CM is magnified even
more by the fact that CM-dependent industries in the U.S. are heavily
reliant on importation from a relatively small number of countries.
Norway, China, Japan, and Finland collectively supplied over 61% of the
cobalt consumed domestically in 2018.43 China supplies 80% of the
nation’s imported rare-earth elements.44 And lithium imports from
Argentina and Chile account for over 50% of the lithium consumption in
the U.S.45 Accordingly, continued access to the minerals critical to
renewable energy depends on an uninterrupted international supply chain.
C. Trade War and Critical Mineral Security
The U.S.’s heavy reliance on importation of CM is concerning in part
because it can sometimes enable foreign powers to leverage their influence
over CM supplies against the U.S. in the foreign policy sphere. For
example, as stated above, China controls 80% of the global supply of rareearth elements.46 This heavy reliance created significant fears within the
U.S. when China reduced its annual tonnage of exports of rare-earth
elements from 2006 to 2009 and then cut its allowed export amount in half
in the second half of 2010.47 China defended these disruptive supply cuts
40. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 51.
41. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1996, supra note 32, at 132;
MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 132.
42. Rare Earth Elements Facts, NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA, https://www
.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/minerals-mining/minerals-metals-facts/rareearth-elements-facts/20522 [https://perma.cc/G865-58HP] (last visited Sept. 10,
2020).
43. Id. at 50.
44. Webb, Shumaker & Oatis, supra note 33.
45. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 98.
46. Mai, supra note 9; H. Sterling Burnett & Wesley Dwyer, Will Green
Energy Make the United States Less Secure?, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.ncpathinktank.org/pub/ba739 [https://perma.cc/J9
JR-EPJH].
47. Marvin L. Astrada, Revisiting the WTO Rare Earths Dispute – Law,
Trade, Sovereignty, & Environmental Security in a Networked World, 46
SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 4 (2018).
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on the grounds that, as an independent sovereign, it was entitled to restrict
exports to regulate environmental protection, ensure sustainable
production levels, and privilege Chinese interests over others.48 However,
China also temporarily discontinued supplying Japan, the U.S., and
Europe with rare-earth elements during a diplomatic stand-off in 2010.49
Although many importers responded to China’s manipulation of rare-earth
supplies with efforts aimed at reducing rare-earth consumption, China
proved CM supplies can be wielded as a powerful sword in foreign
policy.50
Having witnessed China’s use of its CM market dominance as a
foreign policy weapon, some other countries that export CM have signaled
a willingness to mimic China’s actions. This tactic was already
implemented for the non-critical—but essential to battery production—
mineral nickel. Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of nickel, proposed
to enact an export ban on nickel ore in 2019 that would eliminate nine
percent of the market supply.51 The Indonesian government floated the ban
to force miners to invest in value-adding processing.52 The government’s
actions led the European Union to file a complaint concerning the ban with
the World Trade Organization in November 2019.53 This dispute was yet
another chapter in a trade war saga between the EU and Indonesia that
began in early 2019 after the EU imposed stricter limits on the use of palm
oil—an Indonesian export that can be used to produce biofuels.54
Restrictions on exports of minerals like those used by China and Indonesia
48. Id.
49. Jeremy Hsu, Don’t Panic About Rare Earth Elements, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (May 31, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dontpanic-about-rare-earth-elements/ [https://perma.cc/S9A4-YW23]; Bradsher, supra
note 20.
50. Webb, Shumaker & Oatis, supra note 33.
51. Tim Treadgol, Nickel Surges Higher as a Supply Squeeze Looms, Leaving
Gold Even Further Behind, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2019 5:19AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/timtreadgold/2019/09/02/nickel-surges-higher-as-a-supply-sque
eze-looms-leaving-gold-even-further-behind/#4047df07190b
[https://perma.cc/77HX-MXLT].
52. Id.
53. EU-Indonesia Trade War: Nickel Ore Ban & Palm Oil Tariff Disputes
Filed in WTO, EUBULLETIN (Dec. 25, 2019), https://www.eubulletin.com/10499eu-indonesia-trade-war-nickel-ore-ban-palm-oil-tariffs-disputes-filed-in-the-wto
.html [https://perma.cc/92EX-T7TJ].
54. Ewa Krukowska, Palm Oil Is at the Heart of the Next Trade War,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2019, 9:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/art
icles/2019-03-13/palm-oil-trade-war-looms-as-europe-sets-limits-on-use-in-biofuel
[https://perma.cc/9WS6-9M59].
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are unlikely to be isolated events. To the extent that the planet’s economies
rely more and more on reliable supplies of these minerals, the likelihood
of CM supplies being leveraged in foreign policy will only increase.
Because imported CM are crucial to the continued functioning of the
U.S. economy, unstable supplies of CM could impair various industries,
national security, military defense, and the U.S. transition to renewable
energy.55 Former Secretary of the United States Department of Energy
(“DOE”), Rick Perry, specifically suggested that dependence on foreign
sources of CM is a threat to the U.S.56 The U.S. imports 100% of 14
minerals essential to defense technologies, cell phones, and clean energy
production.57 Additionally, the U.S. relies on imports for at least 50% of
30 other minerals.58 Missiles, smart bombs, and satellite communication
would not function without these minerals.59 Under the Obama
Administration, the DOE noted CM were also essential to the transition to
renewable energy technologies.60 For all of these reasons, reducing
dependence on foreign supplies of CM for energy and defense
technologies could do much to secure these important industries.
Since the nation’s heavy reliance on imported CM is an issue with
significant foreign policy implications, responsibility to address it falls
primarily on the federal government. In 2017, the federal government
made some attempts to reduce its vulnerability to CM-related
manipulation from other countries.61 Among other things, President
Trump issued an executive order (“EO”) declaring a policy initiative
aimed at reducing the nation’s vulnerability to supply chain disruptions
and identifying new supplies.62 The EO encouraged greater investment in
CM exploration, mining, concentration, separation, alloying, recycling,
and reprocessing.63 The EO also called for streamlining the leasing and
55. See Nicholas Sanders, A Response to Ryan P. Carpenter’s “The Bottom
of the Smart Weapon Production Chain: Securing the Supply of Rare Earth
Elements for the U.S. Military”, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 957, 958 (2012).
56. Mai, supra note 9.
57. Morgan D. Bazilian, We Need to Get Serious About “Critical Materials”,
SCI. AM. (June 10, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/weneed-to-get-serious-about-critical-materials/ [https://perma.cc/L2U3-U5A8].
58. Id.
59. Sanders, supra note 55, at 958.
60. Critical Materials Institute: An Energy Innovation Hub, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/amo/critical-materials-institute-energy-in
novation-hub [https://perma.cc/9RK9-54AC] (last visited Aug. 25, 2020).
61. Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,835 (Dec. 26, 2017).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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permitting processes for mines and for improving access to topography,
geological, and geophysical surveys to enable mining.64 However, it
neglected to address any international issues involving CM, to create
actual incentives for increasing investment in CM recycling technologies,
or to promote research in CM alternatives. As described below, aggressive
policy actions in these three areas could do much to improve domestic CM
security and ensure a steady transition toward a more sustainable energy
system.
II. THE FEDERAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SECURING RELIABLE CRITICAL
MINERAL SUPPLIES
Recently, the federal government outlined a set of specific strategies
that, if adopted, could reduce risks associated with the nation’s reliance on
CM imports.65 This comprehensive strategic plan acknowledges that
increasing CM exploration, processing, and manufacturing base requires
a government-wide effort.66 The federal plan takes aim at securing CM
supplies, focusing primarily on research, industry supply chains,
international trade, understanding domestic CM, improving access to
domestic CM, decreasing permitting timeframes for mines, and growing
the CM workforce.67
Diversification of domestic CM sources and efficient use of these
materials play a central role in the federal plan.68 Under the federal plan,
diversified sources include deep-sea mining, recycled CM, and alternative
CM materials.69 In addition to developing new sources, the federal
government is promoting research into more efficient uses of CM through
public-private partnerships.70 To achieve these goals, federal officials have
suggested offering tax incentives for private investments in new CMrelated technologies and creating government purchase programs for
products using domestic CM through DOE and Department of Defense
(“DoD”).71
64. Id. at 60,836.
65. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A FEDERAL STRATEGY TO ENSURE SECURE
AND RELIABLE SUPPLIES OF CRITICAL MINERALS 4 (2019), https://www
.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/Critical_Minerals_ Strategy_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HUX5-BV3W] [hereinafter FEDERAL STRATEGY 2019].
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 4–5.
68. Id. at 14–15.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 19–20.
71. Id. at 20–21.
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In addition to new sources, the federal strategy identified a
strengthened CM supply chain as essential.72 The government proposes to
study the CM supply chain and periodically assess market trends in order
to recommend policies like investment in research, capacity expansion,
and stockpiling to alleviate supply problems.73 Deployment of investment
tax credits, capital gains tax exemptions, loan guarantees, trade adjustment
assistance, and small business procurement opportunities plus new federal
legislation are expected to drive private investment to strengthen the
supply chain.74 Under the government’s strategy, private industry plays an
essential role in strengthening the CM supply.
International trade and cooperation compromise additional federal
policies employed to stabilize CM supplies.75 The federal plan expects to
implement policies to improve trade relations and utilize trade
agreements.76 Specifically, by increasing international exchanges with
partner nations, U.S. officials hope to identify new opportunities for CM
trade and collaboration.77 By monitoring and limiting foreign trade
barriers, officials can help to prevent foreign CM trade practices from
harming U.S. industries and broader interests.78
Staying attuned to CM market trends and investing more in
exploration for potential domestic CM supplies are additional strategies
described in the government’s plan. Under the plan, the Department of the
Interior must periodically update its list of CM and develop new, mineralspecific plans to counteract supply, demand, and production changes.79 To
boost domestic CM supplies, the federal plan emphasized development of
maps useful to the mining industry plus promotion of the identification of
new conventional, secondary and unconventional sources of CM.80
According to the federal report, increasing the ability of private industry
to locate new CM resources and understanding CM market behavior
should ultimately lead to more stable CM supplies.
The federal plan likewise demands a greater focus on shortening
federal permitting timeframes and increasing access to public lands
containing CM as a means of increasing domestic CM supplies.81 The
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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government acknowledges that any given mining project may require
several types of permits.82 Expediting the permitting processes for mining,
under the federal plan, requires evaluating National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) and other regulations to improve timely processing of CM
permit applications.83 To improve access, the federal plan promotes new
legislation that better facilitates deep-sea mining and incorporates
terrestrial mineral projects as part of Title 41 of Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation (“FAST-41”).84 The government postulates efficient
permitting and increased CM location access will create secure CM
supplies.
Augmenting both the private and public CM workforces to help drive
increases in CM security is yet another tenet of the federal government’s
strategic plan. The nation’s current CM workforce is aging and
shrinking.85 To reverse this trend, the federal strategy advocates for
policies aimed at bolstering educational opportunities and interest in
mining engineering, geology, and other fields related to CM mining and
manufacturing.86 The federal strategy also identifies a need for the Bureau
of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service to improve recruitment
and retention of staff who are familiar with mining.87 To address these
challenges, the federal plan calls for additional employee training focused
on domestic CM development and increases in the number of field expert
staff positions to hasten the permitting process.88
In short, the federal government identifies a wide array of potential
policy strategies capable of helping the nation to develop more secure and
reliable CM supplies. It highlights the need for a greater focus on research,
the incentivizing of domestic mining and manufacturing, international
trade, building increased knowledge about domestic CM supplies, and
expediting permitting, and workforce augmentation.89 As valuable of a
start as this plan may be, it unfortunately only represents a subset of a
broader menu of important strategies available to better secure CM
supplies for the crucial transition to renewable energy. Moreover, a few of
the approaches advocated in the plan suffer from deficiencies that will

82. Id. (The mining proponent must navigate State, Federal and Tribal
regulations.)
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id. at 43.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id. at 45.
87. Id. at 46.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 4-5.
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likely limit their effectiveness. Accordingly, additional policies are still
needed to fill these gaps.
III. DEVELOP, RECYCLE, AND REPLACE
As just described, the U.S. federal government’s declared plans for
confronting the nation’s CM supply challenges are a useful start but are
likely incapable of fully addressing these increasingly important problems.
Among other things, the federal plan fails to articulate an adequate plan
for utilizing international law and the purchasing power of the general
public to help drive increases in CM supplies within the U.S. The federal
government also neglects to sufficiently clarify the optimal structure of
“tax incentives” for incentivizing important industry activities in this area.
Although the federal strategy suggests that federal agencies can use their
purchasing power to promote greater CM investments, it never describes
how to promote such uses or if congressional legislative action should help
to spur them. Fortunately, there are promising ways of addressing each of
these deficiencies.
Many of the most promising strategies for addressing the nation’s CM
supply challenges involve the development of new CM mines or of
technologies that rely on other mineral resources that are available in
greater abundance. Large quantities of CM reside on the deep seafloor or
in existing products that might otherwise end up in landfills, and
alternative technologies using common substances such as sodium or
carbon may also provide solutions to the global CM scarcity problem.90
This Part describes the current science, regulation, and industry
characteristics of deep-sea mining, CM recycling, and CM alternatives and
argues for specific policy initiatives to more rapidly advance these
90. Karen Uhlenhuth, As World Chases Rare Metal for Batteries, Iowa Looks
to Sodium for Storage Solution, ENERGY NEWS (Oct. 4, 2019), https://ener
gynews.us/2019/10/04/midwest/as-world-chases-rare-metal-for-batteries-iowalooks-to-table-salt-for-storage-solution/ [https://perma.cc/RUB3-9TFA]; Max
Langridge & Luke Edwards, Future Batteries, Coming Soon: Charge in Seconds,
Last Months and Power Over the Air, POCKET-LINT (June 17, 2019), https://
www.pocket-lint.com/gadgets/news/130380-future-batteries-coming-soon-charg
e-in-seconds-last-months-and-power-over-the-air [https://perma.cc/SP24-NDPP];
Melody Bomgardner, Recycling Renewables, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://cen.acs.org/energy/renewables/Recycling-renewables/96/i15
[https://perma.cc/C73J-86FL]; Global Ocean Mineral Resources, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/pcmsc/science/global-oceanmineral-resources?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects [https://
perma.cc/SQL6-GZ3J#qt-science_center_objects](last visited August 25, 2020).
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strategies. By promoting alternatives to foreign CM importation, the U.S.
can develop new industries that contribute to the national economy, secure
its CM supply, and ensure the transition to renewable energy continues
unabated.
A. Deep-Sea Mining
Greater investment in deep-sea mining is arguably the most promising
means of increasing the nation’s supply of many CM—a supply that will
be insufficient to support a full transition to renewable energy if confined
solely to terrestrial sources.91 However, new policy incentives are needed
to allow for deep-sea mining to serve its optimal role in supplying CM.
The most straightforward and promising means of doing that would be for
the federal government to ratify the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) and expedite permitting and licensing for
deep-sea mining through the creation of a programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (“EIS”). Through these two actions, the U.S. federal
government could spur significant new growth in this industry and
ultimately shore up the nation’s CM supplies while also allowing the
public to provide input on deep-sea mining activities. The following
subsections describe deep-sea mining and deposits and how the U.S. could
better position itself to engage in deep-sea CM mining within its own
exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) and beyond.
1. Deep-Sea Minerals
Vast deposits of important CM are already known to exist on the deep
ocean floor.92 Numerous CM such as lithium, cobalt, and rare-earth
elements reside in ferromanganese crusts, polymetallic nodules and
seafloor massive sulphides there.93 Of course, most of these deposits are
located at depths surpassing 500 meters.94
There are multiple potential benefits of diving to the ocean’s floor for
minerals rather than continuing to mine terrestrial resources. Among other
91. PIETER VAN EXTER ET AL., DUTCH MINISTRY OF INFRASTRUCTURE &
WATER MGMT., METAL DEMAND FOR RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN
THE NETHERLANDS 4 (2018); see Gronewold, supra note 1.
92. Olive Heffernan, Seabed Mining is Coming – Bringing Mineral Riches
and Fears of Epic Extinctions, NATURE (July 24, 2019), https://www.nature.com
/articles/d41586-019-02242-y [https://perma.cc/J7SB-3JQR].
93. MACROSOURCE MEDIA, COMMERCIAL DEEP-SEA MINING MARKET
REPORT 9 (2019), https://perma.cc/73JC-4HYG.
94. Id.
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things, deep-sea mining often yields higher grade mineral ores than those
found on land because the best known land deposits have already been
exploited.95 For instance, the quality of copper ore (not a CM but an
excellent example of the issue) from terrestrial mines fell by 25% in the
last ten years.96 According to the World Bank, one ton of land-based ore
is valued at $50-180, while the price per ton of ore extracted from a
polymetallic sulphide deposit is worth $500-1,500.97 Such higher-grade
ores are not only less expensive to process, they may also be more
environmentally friendly in many instances because they tend to require
less energy for processing.98
Deep-sea mining does pose some potential environmental threats, the
full extent of which are admittedly unknown, but these threats can likely
be adequately managed.99 Oceans cover about 70% of the planet, and
scientists have heretofore explored less than one-thousandth of its
expanse.100 Nautilus Minerals’ Solwara 1 Project, the first deep-sea mining
operation, anticipated loss of habitat, disturbance to the seafloor, sediment
plumes, increased noise, and increased metals concentrations in the water
column due to deep-sea mining activities.101 What is known is that deepsea mining requires disturbance of ocean floor sediments and crusts that
take millions of years to reestablish.102 Sediments disturbed during deepsea mining experiments nearly three decades ago still show scars.103 Still,
although deep-sea mining will undoubtedly impact the environment, so
long as those impacts are properly monitored and mitigated, the
environmental benefits of additional CM supplies available through such
mining in many instances seem likely to outweigh the costs.

95. Id. at 13.
96. Martha Henriques, Japan’s Grand Plans to Mine Deep-Sea Vents, BBC
(Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20181221-japans-grand-plans
-to-mine-deap-sea-vents [https://perma.cc/T54D-K7RQ].
97. MACROSOURCE MEDIA, supra note 93, at 13.
98. Id.
99. Rahul Sharma & Samantha Smith, Deep-Sea Mining and the
Environment: An Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES OF DEEP-SEA MINING:
IMPACTS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 3, 12 (Rahul Sharma ed.,
2019).
100. Antje Boetius & Matthias Haeckel, Mind the Seafloor, SCIENCE, Jan. 5,
2018, at 34, 34.
101. NAUTILUS MINERALS NIUGINI LIMITED, SOLWARA 1 PROJECT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 26 (2008).
102. Boetius & Haeckel, supra note 100, at 35.
103. Id.
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2. Regulating Deep-Sea Mining
The geographic location of a CM deposit greatly affects which set of
laws regulates its extraction.104 Some deposits are situated within the EEZs
of individual countries, while others are found at remote depths in
international waters.105 Within EEZs, mining activities for these deposits
are regulated by an individual country.106 Outside of EEZs, international
law generally governs extraction activities.107 Accordingly, deep-sea
mining activities are subject to either international law or the domestic law
of a particular country depending on the specific location of the offshore
mining operation.
a. International Regulations
As stated above, international law generally governs the mining of CM
deposits situated beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction.108
UNCLOS provides the primary international framework governing deepsea mining for most deposits located in international waters.109 UNCLOS
declares the high seas to be the “common heritage of mankind” and
generically labels these regions the “Area.”110 The treaty establishes the
International Seabed Authority (“ISA”) to regulate the “Area” and the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”) to aid in
determining the extent of the “Area.”111 Not surprisingly, extracting

104. Besty Baker & Catherine Danely, Resource Rights in the Continental
Shelf and Beyond: Why the Law of the Sea Convention Matters to Mineral Law,
64 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST 2-1 (2018).
105. Id.
106. Randy W. Tong, It’s Time to Get Off the Bench: The U.S. Needs to Ratify
the Law of the Sea Treaty Before It’s Too Late, 48 U. OF PAC. L. REV. 317, 328
(2017).
107. Id.
108. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
109. Id. at art. 137.
110. Leta Dickinson, Clean Energy Requires Rare Metals. Should We Mine
the Ocean Floor to Get Them?, GRIST (June 25, 2019), https://grist.org/article/
clean-energy-requires-rare-metals-should-we-mine-the-ocean-floor-to-get-them/
[https://perma.cc/P4WR-X7H9]; United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 108, at art. 136–37 (the “Area” is the deep-sea bed outside of the
extended continental shelf where no state exercises sovereign rights).
111. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 108, at
annex II, art. 1.
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resources from this “common heritage of mankind” involves additional
responsibilities.
UNCLOS levies fees on all minerals retrieved from the international
seafloor. Under the treaty, exploitation of deep-sea natural resources in the
“Area” triggers obligations to make in-kind contributions payable to the
States Parties to the Convention, to be shared based on the interests and
needs of the developing States.112 It also requires the ISA and States Parties
to transfer “technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in
the Area so that the Enterprise and all States Parties may benefit.”113
Through these provisions, UNCLOS attempts to spread the economic
benefits and intellectual property gleaned from deep-sea mining activities
among its signatory members.
China, Germany, France and Russia are among the 168 countries
across the world that are signatories to UNCLOS.114 Since 2001, the ISA
has granted 29 exploration contracts for over 1.3 million square miles of
the deep sea.115 China controls more mining exploration areas in
international waters than any other country.116 In contrast, the U.S. and
American companies control zero contracts because the U.S. continues to
resist ratifying the treaty.117
Not all deep-sea exploitations of mineral resources fall subject to the
in-kind contribution requirements under UNCLOS. Deposits within the
EEZs of individual countries are outside the regulation of UNCLOS.118
However, UNCLOS signatory countries may petition to extend their EEZs
past the traditional 200 nautical mile (nm) delineation through
submissions to CLCS.119 Such EEZ extensions are a potential way for
countries to incur fewer UNCLOS fees.120

112. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 108, at art.
82, paras. 1–2, 4.
113. Id. at art. 144.
114. MACROSOURCE MEDIA, supra note 93, at 20; Tong, supra note 106, at 318.
115. MACROSOURCE MEDIA, supra note 93, at 3.
116. Id. at 2.
117. Baker & Danely, supra note 104.
118. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 108, at art. 77.
119. Id. at art. 76. The potential scope of these jurisdictional extensions is not
limitless. See id. at art. 76, para. 5 (the shelf may not extend beyond 350 nm from
the baselines which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or 100 nm beyond
the 2,500-meter isobaths).
120. Baker and Danely, supra note 104.
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b. U.S. Regulations
Existing federal laws and regulations govern nearly every aspect of
deep-sea mining within the EEZ of the U.S. The Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act (“DSHMRA”) regulates deep-sea mining within
the U.S.’s exclusive economic zone, which comprises all areas within 200
nautical miles of the nation’s coastline.121 Among other things, the Act
establishes a licensing regime that ensures the protection of the marine
environment, the safety of life and property at sea, the prevention of
unreasonable interference with other uses of the seas, and conservation of
mineral resources.122 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”) administers the DSHMRA.123 To receive a
DSHMRA exploration license, licensees must substantially comply with a
long list of application requirements, including evidence of sufficient
financial resources, technological capability, an exploration plan, a plan
for the safety of life and property at sea, and a completed National
Environmental Policy Act environmental impact statement.124 Through
this process, NOAA has issued four exploration licenses, including the
Clarion-Clipperton Zone of the south Pacific Ocean, which is in
international waters.125
3. Acceding to UNCLOS
Although a DSHMRA license grants its holder exclusive rights against
other U.S. entities, it may not provide secure rights against those whose
home countries have signed UNCLOS because the U.S. itself is not a
signatory to that treaty.126 Consequently, the U.S. could improve its
capacity to engage in deep-sea mining for CM by acceding to UNCLOS.
Unfortunately, the federal government’s proposed strategic plan for
121. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473
(2018).
122. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act Summary, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_dshmra_sum
mary.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6FY-U7SU] (last visited Aug. 25, 2020).
123. 30 U.S.C. § 1413 (2018).
124. NOAA Deep Seabed Mining Regulations for Exploration Licenses, 15
C.F.R. § 970 (2019).
125. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEEP SEABED MINING,
REPORT TO CONGRESS 9–10 (1987), https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/
gcil_dsm_87_20110607084359.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLF7-48ZK].
126. Deep Seabed Mining: Approval of Exploration of License Extensions, 82
Fed. Reg. 42,327 (Sept. 7, 2017).
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increasing domestic CM supplies makes little mention of the use of
international diplomacy and treaty-making. Instead, the nation’s proposed
strategy relies heavily on international trade and cooperation.127 This
approach creates uncertainty for holders of deep-sea mining permits issued
by NOAA in international waters and hinders U.S. private investment in
such mining activities.
Joining UNCLOS would help the U.S. secure clearer CM-related
property rights in multiple ways. Accession would compel a significant
number of international states to recognize U.S. entities’ real property
claims to deep-sea mining areas.128 It could also facilitate extension of the
nation’s current 200 nm EEZ, thereby providing stronger access rights to
additional jurisdictional territory that potentially contains additional deepsea mineral deposits.129 Acceding to UNCLOS would likewise entitle the
U.S. to share in the intellectual property developed by the ISA and State
Parties and simultaneously protect the country’s own deep-sea miningrelated intellectual property.130 By securing U.S. property rights on the
world stage, signing and ratifying UNCLOS would arguably provide much
greater legal certainty to private U.S. investors in deep-sea CM mining and
thereby do much to strengthen this increasingly important industry.
a. Securing Real Property Rights
The U.S. can secure deep sea property rights beyond its EEZ only by
acceding to UNCLOS. Negotiating bilateral international agreements,
which comprise much of the federal government’s current strategy for
stabilizing CM supplies, is unfortunately incapable of providing reliable
property rights in the deep sea. This problem was evident when the U.S.
entered into a temporary agreement, the Provisional Understanding
Regarding Deep Sea Mining (“Provisional Understanding”), with
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom in the 1980s.131 The Provisional Understanding purported to
resolve potential deep-sea mining claims in international waters.132
However, UNCLOS’ Preparatory Commission declared the Provisional
127. See FEDERAL STRATEGY 2019, supra note 65, at 27.
128. See Tong, supra note 106, at 319.
129. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 108, at art. 76.
130. U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES.48/263 (Nov. 16, 1994);
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 108, at annex III,
art. 5; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 108, at art.
302.
131. Tong, supra note 106, at 332–33.
132. Id. at 333.
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Understanding wholly illegal and rejected any claims made by any party
to it.133 A deep-sea mining regime in conflict with any resolution of
UNCLOS is not recognized by the 167 parties to the treaty.134
Accordingly, the U.S. cannot secure seafloor property rights for CM
mining without signing onto UNCLOS. Signing and ratifying the treaty is
presently the only plausible way to maximize the nation’s access to the
planet’s stores of deep-sea CM by ensuring more secure and reliable
property rights.
More certain and secure property rights attainable through acceding to
UNCLOS would finally help U.S. businesses to overcome the property
rights uncertainty that currently stalls mining activities in international
waters.135 For example, in the 1970s Lockheed Martin invested $500 million
into developing deep-sea diving technologies.136 NOAA granted Lockheed
Martin two deep-sea exploration permits: one in 1984 and the other in 1994
for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.137 However, Lockheed Martin has yet to
undertake at-sea exploration pursuant to either of these licenses.138 NOAA
explicitly noted, in 2017, that Lockheed “continues to find that the market
conditions and the lack of international tenure under UNCLOS prevent the
company from moving forward with [the at-sea phase] of its exploration
plan.”139
Even worse, by not joining UNCLOS the U.S. has prompted some
U.S. companies to use foreign subsidiaries for their deep-sea mining
activities. For instance, the fact the U.S. has not acceded to UNCLOS has
not kept Lockheed Martin out of the deep-sea mining game but has merely
shifted many of the benefits of those activities to a different country.
Lockheed Martin “wanted to join the race for undersea riches, but could
not assume investment risks until it was clear that it would have legal title
to its finding.”140 To mitigate its investment risk yet still participate in the
race, Lockheed Martin moved its deep-sea mining research to a subsidiary
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Deep Seabed Mining: Approval of Exploration of License Extensions, 82
Fed. Reg. 42,327 (Sept. 7, 2017).
136. MACROSOURCE MEDIA, supra note 93, at 4.
137. Deep Seabed Mining: Approval of Exploration of License Extensions, 82
Fed. Reg. 42,327.
138. Id. at 42,329.
139. Id.
140. Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify
the Law of the Sea Treaty, THE ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012), https://www.the
atlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-shou
ld-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/ [https://perma.cc/8PBX-VJFD].
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in the United Kingdom (a country party to UNCLOS), secured licenses
from ISA, and invested around $16 million.141 Joining UNCLOS would
ensure other major players in deep-sea mining such as China, Russia, and
the United Kingdom recognize the claims of the U.S., creating a viable
way for U.S. companies to engage directly in deep-sea mining markets.
b. Securing Additional Resources
The U.S. federal government’s signing of UNCLOS would also
potentially allow for an extension of the country’s conventional 200 nm
exclusive economic zone. Under Part VI of UNCLOS, coastal sovereign
nations receive ownership rights to the resources on the continental
shelf.142 The treaty also allows a coastal state with a broad continental
margin to establish an EEZ beyond 200 nm.143 EEZs are an appealing area
for a country to embark in deep-sea mining activities: Mining within a
nation’s EEZ provides greater emergency response capabilities, greater
worker safety, better understood marine environments, and typically lower
total costs.144 Moreover, the possibility of extending the EEZ is becoming
even more important now because, as the climate changes, receding ice in
the Arctic is opening up new seafloor that could ultimately include CM.145
For instance, Norwegian researchers recently found new sulphide vent
systems possessing CM in the Arctic.146
Unless it accedes to UNCLOS, the U.S. cannot assert solid property
rights in areas beyond its 200 nm EEZ or protest foreign nation’s EEZ
extension petitions. Presently, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, and
even the U.S. are preparing submissions to CLCS to extend their EEZs in
the Arctic.147 However, unless the U.S. ratifies UNCLOS, it may have no
representative on CLCS and no standing to challenge other States’

141. MACROSOURCE MEDIA, supra note 93, at 4.
142. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 108, at art. 77.
143. Id.
144. Baker & Danely, supra note 104.
145. Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea
Convention, THE DIPLOMAT (May 24, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/us-ratification-of-the-law-of-the-sea-convention/[https://perma.cc/L2DZ-C7G7].
146. Damian Carrington, Is Deep Sea Mining Vital for a Greener Future –
Even if it Destroys Ecosystems?, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 4, 2017 8:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/04/is-deep-sea-mining-vital
-for-greener-future-even-if-it-means-destroying-precious-ecosystems [https://per
ma.cc/J2GR-UY9U].
147. Almond, supra note 145.
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claims.148 For example, the U.S. once attempted to challenge China’s
overreaching jurisdictional claims in South China based upon UNCLOS
but failed because of its lack of accession.149 Further, as a non-party to the
treaty, even if the U.S. makes a submission to the CLCS, it may not be
legally recognizable—a potentially significant problem since the U.S.
currently has overlapping claims to portions of the Arctic with Russia and
Canada.150 By acceding to UNCLOS, the U.S. would gain power to defend
its property rights at a level recognized by other world powers.
c. Protecting Intellectual Property
Joining UNCLOS would likewise secure U.S. intellectual property
rights related to deep-sea mining, further ensuring a more stable domestic
CM supply. Years ago, section 5 of UNCLOS flatly mandated transfers of
relevant intellectual property from developing Member States to other
Member States.151 However, amendments fairly recently made to the
treaty replaced this mandate with more nuanced principles relating to
technology transfers.152 Among other things, under these new provisions
if a technology transfer poses a threat to national security the State Party
is not forced to disclose the technology.153 Ratifying UNCLOS would
allow the U.S. to gain access to current data and technologies related to
the deep sea and protect its intellectual property critical to national
security.
In summary, accession to UNCLOS places the U.S. in a better position
to protect both real and intellectual property rights related to deep-sea
mining. Ratification would allow the U.S.’s claims to valuable CM
locations in the Area to be recognized by 168 other parties, including
China who is currently the largest holder of deep-sea mining rights.
Moreover, the United States will secure and be able to defend its extended
EEZ, likely containing additional valuable resources, which is closer to
land and more appealing to industry because transportation costs from land
are lower. Finally, the U.S. will secure its intellectual property by having
access to information developed under UNCLOS as well as the protection
afforded by article 302 which prevents disclosure of information related
148.
149.
150.
151.
144.
152.
153.
302.
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to national security interests. Use of international law fills the gaps left in
the federal government’s strategy when relying on trade agreements alone.
Joining UNCLOS will incentivize deep-sea mining and securing CM.
4. Expediting Permitting and Licensing
The U.S. federal government could further shore up the nation’s
domestic CM supplies by engaging NOAA to develop a programmatic EIS
for deep-sea mining within the country’s EEZ. A programmatic EIS would
expedite permitting and leasing, which are costly hurdles for many
offshore mining projects. Development of a traditional terrestrial mine
requires a large investment of time, some seven to ten years.154 NEPA
frequently creates significant permitting delays for terrestrial mines
because of its notoriously lengthy review process.155 Federal agencies may
spend up to three years preparing an EIS for a mining project.156 The
NEPA process then continues for potentially an additional six years before
culminating in a Record of Decision granting final approval.157 Under
current regulations, deep-sea mining proponents must develop an EIS and
thus be subject to this lengthy timetable.158 To help address this problem,
Congress expressly authorized NOAA to create a Programmatic EIS
(“PEIS”) for offshore mining in the DSHMRA.159
Although the federal government’s current strategic plan for
increasing CM supplies advocates for expedited permitting and leasing of
terrestrial mines through the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation
(FAST-41) program,160 the existing permitting will need to be significantly
restructured to truly become an expedited process tailored to account for
the unique characteristics of deep-sea mining work. FAST-41 is arguably
inappropriate for deep-sea mining because, unlike surface transportation

154. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CRITICAL MATERIALS STRATEGY 104 (2010),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/news/documents/criticalmaterialsstr
ategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UUW-72LL].
155. See Consolidation of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 112th Cong.
39 (2012) (prepared statement of Katie Sweeney, General Counsel, National
Mining Association).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act §109(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1419(d)
(2018).
159. Id. § 1419(c).
160. FEDERAL STRATEGY 2019, supra note 65, at 43.
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and terrestrial mining, the environmental effects are largely unknown.
Instead, a programmatic EIS would provide a promising alternative.
The increasing use of PEISs to accelerate solar energy development
illustrates their potential value as tools for encouraging deep-sea CM
mining. In response to growing interest in utility-scale solar energy
development on federally owned lands, the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) and DOE coordinated with States, Tribes, and the public to
develop a programmatic EIS for prime solar energy development areas.161
Through this process, BLM identified low conflict zones for solar
installations and developed publicly vetted mitigation strategies that could
be quickly adopted for subsequent solar projects.162 As a result of this
effort, in 2015 BLM approved projects in the low conflict zones in less
than half the time previously required for similar projects.163 By
developing pre-screened, low conflict zones and providing vetted
mitigation measures to protect wildlife and their habitat, the BLM and
DOE dramatically expedited the permitting process for these important
projects.164
By preparing a similar PEIS that designates low conflict deep-sea CM
mining locations and a vetted mitigation strategy, NOAA could similarly
accelerate the permitting process and incentivize more private companies
to invest in these projects. NOAA’s PEIS could feature many elements
similar to those of the BLM’s and DOE’s Solar Energy Program.
Specifically, the NOAA PEIS could include a process for identifying low
conflict priority areas for deep-sea mining and establishing mitigation
measures for deep-sea mining in the EEZ to ensure environmentally
responsible development. Adoption of a PEIS that shortened NEPA
timelines would attract greater private investment in developing a
domestic supply of CM.
B. Increasing the Recycling of Critical Minerals
Improving the nation’s CM recycling capabilities and driving the
market demand for recycled CM is yet another essential component of any
161. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ES-1, FINAL
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (“PEIS”) FOR SOLAR
DEVELOPMENT IN SIX SOUTHWESTERN STATES (2012).
162. Id.
163. Alex Daue, Dry Lake Success Demonstrates Public Lands Solar
Potential, MEDIUM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/@alex_daue/dry-lakesuccess-demonstrates-public-lands-solar-potential-5034bf01e6eb [https://perma.
cc/WA3T-9GYA].
164. Id.
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comprehensive set of strategies for ensuring more reliable long-term CM
supplies. Lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines often have
lifespans of 25 years or less.165 Unfortunately, the U.S. presently has very
limited infrastructure for recycling the CM embedded in these and other
products back into high quality minerals.
CM recycling transforms rare, finite CM supplies into at least
somewhat renewable ones by making it possible to reuse those supplies in
subsequently-manufactured products. For example, direct-drive wind
turbines contain 51 to 208 kilograms of rare earth elements per megawatt
of generating capacity.166 The Toyota Prius, a hybrid electric vehicle, totes
around 20 pounds of rare earth elements,167 and Americans purchased over
four million comparable hybrid electric cars from 1999 to 2016.168 And
more than seven million tons of solar panels exist in the U.S., all of which
also contain CM.169 Absent an adequate and viable recycling system for
them, the tons of CM found in these products will ultimately become waste
in landfills.170
Some large companies are already increasingly demanding recycled
CM. For example, the technology behemoth Apple, Inc., has announced
aggressive plans to transition from using virgin CM in its products to using
recycled CM instead. The company boldly declared in its 2017
Environmental Responsibility Report, “[c]an we one day stop mining the

165. Benjamin Mow, STAT FAQs Part 2: Lifetime of PV Panels, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.nrel.gov/state-localtribal/blog/posts/stat-faqs-part2-lifetime-of-pv-panels.html [https://perma.cc/L6
YJ-BAXT]; Repowering Wind Turbines Adds Generating Capacity at Existing
Sites, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayin
energy/detail.php?id=33632 [https://perma.cc/5TE9-LN64].
166. D.D. Imholte et al., An Assessment of U.S. Rare Earth Availability for
Supporting U.S. Wind Energy Growth Targets, 113 ENERGY POL’Y 294, 294 (2018).
167. Eichner, supra note 8, at 262.
168. Jeff Cobb, Americans Buy Their Four-Millionth Hybrid Car, HYBRID
CARS (June 6, 2016), https://www.hybridcars.com/americans-buy-their-fourmillionth-hybrid-car/ [https://perma.cc/B34E-9X2U].
169. Kirstin Linnenkoper, U.S. Recyclers Await Critical Mass in Solar Panel
Market, RECYCLING INT’L (Dec. 16, 2019), https://recyclinginternational.com/escrap/getting-a-handle-on-the-new-kids-on-the-block-pv-modules/29006/ [https:
//perma.cc/B34E-9X2U].
170. Avery Thompson, We Night Not Have Enough Materials for All the Solar
Panels and Wind Turbines We Need, POPULAR MECHS. (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/a25576543/renewable-limits
-materials-dutch-ministry-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/5BSZ-6JTU].
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Earth altogether? It sounds crazy, but we’re working on it.”171 Although
commitments from companies like Apple are a valuable start, building a
robust and mature CM recycling industry within the U.S. will require
proactive new policies designed to ensure a steady supply of recyclable
material, access to debt-financing, stronger financial incentives to develop
CM recycling facilities, and a robust back-end demand for recycled CM
products.
The federal government’s plan described above acknowledges the
need to increase the country’s capacity to recycle CM.172 To pursue this
objective, the federal plan calls for the introduction of new investment tax
credit programs, government purchase programs, and certain other DoD
and DOE activities to help spur private sector investment.173
Unfortunately, while the generic strategy descriptions in the plan are
useful, they do not lay out a clear and viable path for building a robust
domestic CM recycling industry. Among other things, the federal plan
fails to explain how to ensure that recycled CM are able to compete on
price with virgin CM sources. Fortunately, the strategy’s shortcomings
could be easily addressed through additional, compatible policies. A more
comprehensive policy approach to developing a domestic CM recycling
industry would focus on ensuring steady supplies of recyclables, access to
affordable capital to build out CM recycling infrastructure, and a steady
market demand for recycled CM. Policies capable of helping to achieve
these conditions include landfill bans, loan guarantee programs,
government purchase programs, production tax credits, and investment tax
credits.
1. Landfill and Exportation Bans for Recyclable CM
One way to better promote domestic recycling of CM would be to
impose a federal ban on the landfilling and exporting of CM-containing
products. A functioning CM recycling industry must operate more
frequently than just a few days a year to be viable, so creating a consistent
domestic supply of CM recyclables for recyclers to process is key.174 A
federal ban on exporting and landfilling specific items that contain CM,
including old solar panels, decommissioned wind turbine parts, and spent
171. Zoë Schlanger, Apple Wants to Try to “Stop Mining the Earth
Altogether” to Make Your iPhone, QUARTZ (April 20, 2017), https://qz.com/96
4862/apple-says-it-will-stop-using-rare-earth-minerals-to-make-iphones/ [https:
//perma.cc/XF32-T9VL].
172. FEDERAL STRATEGY 2019, supra note 65, at 14.
173. Id. at 20–21.
174. Linnenkoper, supra note 169.
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lithium ion batteries from vehicles, would help to generate this steady
supply.
U.S. regulators have already succeeded in creating a reliable supply of
recyclable materials for a similar product: the lead-acid batteries found in
most gas-combustion vehicles. Lead-acid battery recycling represents one
of the most successful recycling campaigns in the U.S., with 98% of all
lead-acid batteries collected and recycled.175 Factors contributing to the
industry’s success include prohibitions on the disposal and export of
batteries and effective consumer education programs.176
Federal laws have long banned lead-acid batteries from landfills. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) classifies lead-acid
batteries as hazardous waste due to their toxic levels of lead.177 RCRA
allows the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to control
hazardous waste generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and
disposal.178 RCRA limits the export of lead acid batteries.179 With the
limitation on exportation, the EPA aimed to create a demand for recycling.
Effective consumer education accompanied the federal government’s
lead-acid battery landfill ban in the form of nationwide labeling and
education programs. The Battery Act preempts state laws to establish
national, uniform labeling requirements for certain batteries.180 The Act
also mandates that the EPA establish and implement education programs
on lead-acid battery recycling and proper disposal of used batteries.181
Importantly, the Battery Act mandates that the EPA also consult with
manufacturers and retailers when creating the education program.182
Through these and other efforts, American consumers have been made
175. Lauren Neuhaus, The Electrifying Problem of Used Lithium Ion
Batteries: Recommendations for Recycling and Disposal, 42 ENVIRONS ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y J. 67, 78 (2018).
176. Id.; Linda Gaines, The Future of Automotive Lithium-Ion Battery
Recycling: Charting a Sustainable Course, 1–2 SUSTAINABLE MATERIALS &
TECHS. 2 (2014).
177. 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (2019); James Griffin, RCRA Options for Recycling
Waste Lead-Acid Batteries, LION NEWS (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.lion.com/
Lion-News/September-2012/RCRA-Options-for-Recycling-Waste-Lead-acid-Ba
tteri [https://perma.cc/LW4J-87XA].
178. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (2018).
179. 40 C.F.R. § 262.83 (2019).
180. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MERCURYCONTAINING AND RECHARGEABLE BATTERY MANAGEMENT ACT (1997),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/10000MXZ.PDF?Dockey=10000MXZ.PDF
[https://perma.cc/6JDK-C8LX].
181. Id.
182. Id.
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aware of proper disposal procedures and thereby enabled the high
recycling rates for lead-acid batteries seen today.
To create a steady supply for CM recyclers, the federal government
should mimic aspects of the regulations on lead-acid batteries. Parts of
RCRA and the Battery Act should be adopted to promote a supply of
products for recycling. Banning particular CM products from export and
landfilling would immediately create a demand for recycling as an
alternative disposal strategy. Labeling would help better inform the public
regarding which products are subject to the requirement and regarding the
proper means of their disposal. Educating consumers and manufacturers
of the disposal requirements would also increase the likelihood that
specific items are properly disposed.
2. Federal Loan Guarantees for CM Recycling Projects
A federal loan guarantee program directed at CM recycling facilities
could also help to spur greater private investment in CM recycling
infrastructure. Companies tackling new technological challenges such as
CM recycling often face hurdles when seeking debt financing.
Commercial lenders tend to be understandably hesitant to take on risky,
unproven ventures such as deployment of new technology—especially at
relatively low interest rates.183 Such risk aversion of lenders can
unfortunately create major difficulties for companies intent on securing
long-term debt financing to fund these projects.184 Federal loan guarantee
programs are a proven means of ensuring access to financing for new and
important ventures.185 A federal loan guarantee is a loan provided by an
agency or another federal program that is backed by the full faith and credit
of the U.S., meaning if the borrower ultimately defaults the full debt will
be paid by the U.S. government.186 Historically, these loan programs have
been used to facilitate greater private investment in specific industry areas
in furtherance of certain public policy goals.187 Both the DOE and DoD
have offered various loan guarantee programs over the years, some of

183. Title XVII Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www
.energy.gov/lpo/title-xvii [https://perma.cc/8SG4-KWQJ] (last visited Aug. 24,
2020).
184. Id.
185. Hilary Kao, Beyond Solyndra: Examining the Department of Energy’s
Loan Guarantee Program, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 448
(2013).
186. Id. at 450.
187. Id.
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which could be adapted to similarly promote investment in CM recycling
facilities.188
Other important fledgling industries have recently benefited from
similar federal loan guarantee programs. For instance, at least some of the
rapid growth in the nation’s renewable energy industry is likely
attributable to loan guarantee programs. Among other things, Title XVII
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a loan guarantee program that
ultimately accelerated declines in the market prices for utility-scale solar
power projects.189 Congress authorized the 1705 loan program and for the
DOE to issue loans in 2009.190 In 2011, the DOE finally obtained funds
for the 1705 Program and issued $10.5 billion in project financing in two
months before the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”)
sunset in September.191
Even with its limited funding timeframe, the DOE’s 1705 loan
guarantee program produced enormously successful overall results. The
DOE issued guaranteed loans for five utility scale solar projects and five
concentrating solar projects.192 Overall, by investing $4 billion, the DOE
closed $37.8 billion in loan guarantees for 36 innovative clean energy
programs.193 The loan guarantee program drove venture capitalists to
invest in the best technology, allowing winners to emerge.194 As stated in
Forbes, “[f]inancing tools and direct investment from the federal
government can help bridge this well-known ‘Commercialization Valley
of Death,’ and the [loan guarantee program] is an effective way of doing
that.”195 The federal loan guarantee program proved very successful in the
solar industry.
188. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16511–16515 (2018); 10
C.F.R. § 609 (2020); 48 C.F.R. § 32.303 (2020).
189. TROY RULE, RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
369 (2018).
190. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) § 406, 42
U.S.C. § 16516 (Supp. IV 2010).
191. Kao, supra note 185, at 454.
192. RULE, supra note 189, at 369.
193. Devon Swezey, Solyndra’s Failure is No Reason to Abandon Federal
Energy Innovation Policy, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2011 7:33PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/energysource/2011/09/02/solyndras-failure-is-no-reason-to-abandon-fed
eral-energy-innovation-policy/#2a35b9e12df9. [https://perma.cc/U4G7-LPFV]
(Naysayers of the DOE’s federal loan program latched on to the bankruptcy of
loan recipient Solyndra, a solar panel manufacturer. However, the loan made to
Solyndra represented less than two percent of DOE total loan commitments.)
194. Id.
195. Id.
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Given the success of past programs in other technology areas, the DOE
and DoD should expand their loan guarantee programs to target start-up
CM recyclers. Recall, due to DOE’s incentives, explosive growth is
occurring in the renewable energy and battery sectors which is driving the
consumption of CM. The DoD, while not increasing CM consumption via
policies, is forcing CM depletion due to continuous purchases of defense
items.196 Because these agencies rely on CM for essential functions, they
are in the best position to drive use of recycled CM. A federal loan
program offers to mitigate some of the CM instability created by defense
and renewable generation and storage growth due to previous policies and
continue to grow industries crucial to decarbonization.
New loan programs would help the CM recycling industry to prove
the financial viability of CM recycling, helping to pave the way for future
growth in the industry. The DoD has purchased a considerable number of
products containing CM, such as jet engines, smart missiles, and night
vision goggles,197 which suggests that the agency has a significant interest
in further promoting the nation’s CM security. Loan guarantee programs
would assist in that effort. Startups are already pursuing a wide range of
different methods for increasing CM recovery from products, but
financing challenges could ultimately impede the growth of these
innovative companies without such federal support.198 Moreover, as the
renewable energy federal loan guarantee programs described above
showed, the federal government may well recoup more than it invests in
such programs.
3. Production Tax Credits for Recycled Critical Minerals
A federal production tax credit (“PTC”) aimed at recycled minerals
would be another potentially promising means of stimulating the
196. C. Todd Lopez, DOD Finalizes Purchase Plan for F-35 Aircraft, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/
Article/2002585/dod-finalizes-purchase-plan-for-f-35-aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/
SM77-8TY2].
197. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2019, supra note 3, at 51; Sanders,
supra note 55.
198. Harmon Leon, Startup Develops Eco-Friendly Process to Recycle
Lithium-Ion EV Batteries, OBSERVER (Dec. 27, 2019, 1:24PM), https://observer
.com/2019/12/duesenfeld-lithium-ion-battery-recycling-eco-friendly/ [https://per
ma.cc/28WK-VPGV]; Mitch Jacoby, It’s Time to Get Serious About Recycling
Lithium-Ion Batteries, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (July 14, 2019), https://
cen.acs.org/materials/energy-storage/time-serious-recycling-lithium/97/i28 [https:/
/perma.cc/EV7W-5B4J].
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production of recycled CM. Currently, many technologies for recycling
CM-containing products remain in their infancy. For large format lithiumion (“LF Li-ion”) batteries, only three primary recovery processes are
presently available.199 LF Li-ion batteries may be smelted at high
temperatures with some valuable minerals recovered.200 However, the
lithium recovered through this process is relatively low-grade and has
historically been used primarily as an additive to concrete.201 Direct
recovery methods allow for retrieval of battery-grade materials with low
energy requirements.202 Intermediate recovery results in the salvage of
lithium of a quality that is higher than that of smelting, but lower than that
produced through direct recovery methods.203 Wind turbine magnets are
currently recycled through smelting.204 To spur higher recovery rates,
demand for this type of recycled CM needs to increase.
The total cost of recycling CM from old products are significantly
higher today than those of other disposal options such as landfilling, which
has led to minimal private investment in CM recycling technologies.205
Moreover, the prospect that new CM alternative technologies could
ultimately depress demand for valuable CM such as cobalt from batteries
and solar panels further limits interest in CM recycling.206 The federal plan
does not include any strategies for increasing the market value of recycled
CM. Instead, it focuses primarily on offering investment tax credits
(“ITC”) to attract additional private investment in the development of new
recycling facilities.207 Although the ITC could have positive effects,
incentives may be needed to increase demand because even with an ITC

199. Batteries for Hybrid and Plug-In Electric Vehicles, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_batteries.html [https://perma
.cc/AKE2-3ANJ] (last visited Aug. 25, 2020).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Jan Dodd, Rethinking the Use of Rare-Earth Elements, WIND POWER
MONTHLY (Nov. 30, 2018) https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1519
221/rethinking-use-rare-earth-elements [https://perma.cc/TDL9-9RG9].
205. Jeff McMahon, Innovation Is Making Solar Panels Harder To Recycle,
FORBES (Sept. 4, 2018) https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2018/09/04/
innovation-is-making-solar-panels-harder-to-recycle/#304c3a214c0a [https://per
ma.cc/U35Q-SS4P].
206. Id.
207. FEDERAL STRATEGY 2019, supra note 65, at 20–21.
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the market prices of recycled CM will likely be more expensive at first
than their virgin domestic counterparts.208
A federal “renewable minerals” PTC could provide the additional
boost needed to help recycled CM become cost-competitive with virgin
CM and thereby unleash strong growth in CM recycling markets. In the
renewable energy context, PTCs proved to be highly effective at
generating strong market demand for a particular product. In 1992,
Congress created a renewable energy PTC in the Energy Policy Act of
1992 to incentivize greater production and sale of certain types of
renewable power as a means of diminishing U.S. dependence on foreign
energy.209 In its original form, the PTC allowed taxpayers to claim the
credits for the production and sale of power from eligible renewable
resources such as wind for ten years.210 Further, the renewable energy PTC
included curtailment and phase out provisions. Because the PTC was
offered for a limited time, it created a strong financial incentive for
developers to rapidly pursue the development of new wind energy
projects.211
Recycled CM are similar to wind energy in multiple ways. Wind
energy competes against finite and less-sustainable fossil fuel resources,212
and recycled CM must likewise compete against an entrenched and lesssustainable virgin CM industry.213 Both recycled CM and wind-generated
electricity are also measurable on a per unit basis. Because of these
similarities, it is easy to imagine how a PTC structure comparable to that
used to promote wind energy development could similarly aid in fueling
market demand for recycled CM.
A new federal “renewable minerals” PTC could be structured to award
tax credits on a per unit basis as a means of helping recycled CM to
208. Curt Harler, Rare Opportunity to Recycle Rare Earths, RECYCLING
TODAY (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.recyclingtoday.com/article/rare-earth-metalsrecycling/ [https://perma.cc/45JN-TKQK].
209. Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 13317a (2018).
210. 26 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2018); see Victoria Chang, Wind Energy Incentives in
Texas, 14 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 189, 196 (2019); see also Renewable
Electricity Production Tax CREDIT, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program
/detail/734 [https://perma.cc/74EH-8E78] (last visited Aug. 25, 2020) (PTC is
calculated on a per kilowatt hour basis).
211. RULE, supra note 189, at 124–25 (Describing the phasing out of the PTC).
212. Nicolas Loris, The Wind Production Tax Credit and the Case for Ending
All Energy Subsidies, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 323, 323–24 (2014); see
also General Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22–42 (2018) (Congress began
incentivizing terrestrial domestic mining as early as 1872).
213. General Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22–42.
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become price-competitive with virgin CM. Eligibility for the credits could
likewise be limited to only certain types of recycled CM that are
particularly needed to support renewable energy and battery growth and
that met specific quality standards. By limiting the availability of
renewable minerals PTCs to a certain number of years and then phasing it,
Congress could incentivize private entities to invest sooner rather than
later in developing new CM recycling facilities. Much like the PTC did
for wind energy, such a “renewable minerals” PTC could potentially be a
powerful instrument for increasing CM recycling capacity, advancing
technologies in this area, and accelerating the maturity of domestic CM
recycling markets.
4. Federal Investment Tax Credits for CM Recycling Facilities
Federal investment tax credits could be another powerful means of
spurring growth and investment in the nation’s emerging CM recycling
industry. A federal ITC program has already proven successful at helping
to catalyze rapid growth in the nation’s renewable energy sector. The
renewable energy ITC, established under the Energy Tax Act of 1978,
rewards investments in renewable energy generation technologies such as
solar, fuel cells, and small wind projects.214 The ITC is available to any
utility, private entity, or individual that makes a qualifying investment in
eligible renewable energy projects or devices.215 Like the renewable
energy PTC, the ITC program has expiration dates built into it that have
long helped to drive short-term investment.216 By one account, the ITC is
estimated to have helped the solar industry grow over 10,000% since
2006.217
Even as the renewable energy ITC sunsets, renewable energy markets
in the U.S. remain poised for continued growth. Grid-level energy storage
development is expected to increase rapidly in the coming years, with a
jump from 12 gigawatt-hours of storage capacity in 2018 to 158 gigawatt-

214. Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner,
More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 314 (2014).
215. Michael Seibert, Ain’t No Sunshine When It’s Gone: The Future of the
Louisiana–Solar Initiative After the Demise of the Solar Energy Income Tax
Credit, 78 LA. L. REV. 705, 710–11 (2018).
216. Solar Investment Tax Credit, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N,
http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit [https://perma
.cc/5CU6-LSTP] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020).
217. Id.
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hours by 2024.218 Meanwhile, solar panel installations reached two million
in mid-2019 and are expected to grow to over four million installations in
the U.S. by 2023.219 The DOE expects domestic wind energy generating
capacity to increase by 110.66 gigawatts by 2030.220
As it has done for certain types of renewable energy, an ITC program
for recycled CM could significantly increase private investment in CM
recycling. Specifically, a “renewable minerals” ITC program could be
structured to provide financial incentives for taxpayers that invest in the
development of qualifying CM recycling facilities. A clear expiration date
or phase-out schedule for the renewable minerals ITC could similarly
create urgency and spur more short-term investment.
5. Leveraging Government Purchasing Power
Directing the federal government to purchase far more products
containing recycled CM is an additional means of further bolstering
demand for recycled CM. Of all the agencies, the DoD possesses the
greatest purchasing power.221 At times, the DoD’s purchasing power has
comprised as much as 2.5% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product.222
Moreover, the DoD regularly purchases CM containing products like F-35
aircraft, smart bombs, and night vision goggles.223 In 2019, the DoD
purchased 478 F-35 aircraft worth a total of $34 billion.224 The DoD’s
purchasing power and the necessity to continue purchasing products like
jets for national security present a great opportunity to increase recycled
CM demand.

218. Jeff St. John, Global Energy Storage to Hit 158 Gigawatt-Hours by 2024,
Led by U.S. and China, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/global-energy-storage-to-hit-158-gigawatt-ho
urs-by-2024-with-u-s-and-china [https://perma.cc/DP9D-RMUG].
219. United States Surpasses 2 Million Solar Installations, SOLAR ENERGY
INDUSTRIES ASS’N (May 9, 2019), https://www.seia.org/news/united-statessurpasses-2-million-solar-installations [https://perma.cc/E6QJ-H523].
220. Wind Vision, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/maps/
map-projected-growth-wind-industry-now-until-2050 [https://perma.cc/9PNP-J
HCA] (last visited Aug. 25, 2020).
221. Samuel M. Borowski, The Inchoate Mistake: Demystifying the Defense
Department’s Competition Problem, 45 PUB. CONT. L.J. 183, 186 (2016).
222. Id.
223. VALERIE BAILEY GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33751, THE
SPECIALTY METAL CLAUSE: OVERSIGHT ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 6
(2014).
224. Lopez, supra note 196.
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Congress could harness more of the DoD’s purchasing power to help
grow the domestic CM recycling industry through new standards that
mandated that the DoD gradually have an increasing proportion recycled
CM in newly- procured equipment and products. The federal specialty
metals statute presently prohibits the DoD from acquiring products
“containing a specialty metal not melted or produced in the U.S.: aircraft,
missile and space systems, ships, tank and automotive items, weapon
systems, or ammunition.”225 This statute could be easily amended to
require a gradually-increasing percentage of recycled CM to be present in
these items.
The DoD could further use its purchasing power to help drive recycled
CM demand through revisions to its Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (“DFARS”).226 For example, via a recent DFARS
final rule, DoD prohibited purchase of certain magnets from North Korea,
China, Russia, and Iran.227 In a similar way, the DoD could promulgate a
rule requiring the contact-purchased items to aggregately contain some
minimum proportion or quantity of domestically recycled CM. Such an
action would not only increase demand for recycled CM; it would also
reduce the capacity for foreign nations to use CM supplies as leverage
against U.S. interests. By increasing the stability of domestic CM supplies,
such actions could also help to accelerate the nation’s transition to
renewable energy and national security.
C. Promoting the Development of Critical Minerals Alternatives
Policies that promote the development of alternatives to CM use are
one other important component of any comprehensive plan to increase the
nation’s CM security. In many types of renewable energy products and
devices, there are strong reasons to believe that replacing CM with nonCM materials will ultimately be possible. When China briefly stopped
supplying Japan rare-earth elements in 2010, Japan began working on
alternative materials to reduce and replace the elements.228 And when
global rare-earth element prices spiked in 2011, some wind turbine

225. 10 U.S.C. §2533b(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added) (Currently “specialty
metals” includes steel, metal alloys consisting of nickel and cobalt in excess of
10%, titanium, and zirconium.).
226. 48 C.F.R. pts. 200–253 (2020).
227. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 84 Fed. Reg.
72,239 (2019) (heralded as “shield[ing] U.S. critical resource needs from the
decisions of foreign adversaries”).
228. Burnett & Dwyer, supra note 46.
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manufacturers developed alternative magnet formulas with reduced use of
rare-earth elements.229
Due to instabilities in the global CM market, companies are
increasingly exploring possible means of using more common materials
as substitutes. For instance, early studies suggest that carbon-based
graphene batteries may potentially be superior to lithium-ion batteries in
both energy density and charging speeds.230 Even saltwater holds potential
as a CM substitute.231 Developing ways to replace CM with non-CM
materials in wind turbines, batteries, and other parts of sustainable energy
infrastructure could diminish insecurity in domestic supply chains and
ultimately have very positive effects on renewable energy growth. In light
of this, it is hardly surprising that the federal plan specifically recommends
using federal funding to establish and continue public-private research
relationships focused on alternatives to CM-based technologies.232
Implementing such regulations could eventually prove highly influential
in helping to drive the nation’s transition to a carbon neutral economy.
1. Federal Research Grants
Federal research grants for technologies that involve alternatives to
CM are a particularly promising means of driving more research and
innovation in that area. The federal government has long used various
research grant programs to fund research at universities and other
nonprofit institutions.233
One recent successful example of a federally funded research grant
program is the DOE’s SunShot initiative for solar energy. In 2011, the
DOE created a new research funding program aimed at reducing the cost

229. Dodd, supra note 204.
230. Martyn Casserly, Lithium-Ion vs Graphene, TECHADVISOR (Sept. 24,
2019), https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/mobile-phone/lithium-ion-vs-grap
hene-3702749/ [https://perma.cc/SNL2-WSQC]; Jelor Gallego, Scientists
Develop a Better Graphene Battery, FUTURISM (Mar. 7, 2016), https://futur
ism.com/scientists-develop-better-battery-thanks-graphene [https://perma.cc/B6
JE-NQJL].
231. Bianca Nogrady, Build a Better battery for Wind and Solar Storage, and
the Energy Sector will Beat a Path to Your Door, ENSIA (Sept. 27, 2019), https://
ensia.com/features/battery-innovations-renewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/DA
P7-MGT8].
232. FEDERAL STRATEGY 2019, supra note 65, at 14.
233. RULE, supra note 189, at 367.

350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd 61

2/25/21 8:40 AM

58

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IX

of solar energy systems by 75% from 2010 prices by 2020.234 The DOE
determined that achieving such reductions in cost would enable solar
energy technologies to finally become price-competitive with more
conventional energy strategies.235 Over the past decade, numerous national
laboratories, universities, and other solar industry stakeholders received
research funding through the SunShot initiative.236 The DOE provided
over $900 million to fund more than 350 projects during the initiative’s
first three years alone.237 Impressively, SunShot ultimately reached its
initial goal of reducing the cost of solar by 75% by 2017—three years
ahead of schedule.238 The SunShot Initiative’s success demonstrates the
potential effectiveness of federal research grant programs focused on a
particular goal for incentivizing development of a new and important
industry.
Although potential disruptions in CM supplies seem like a relatively
new concern, research recognizing the potential for such disruptions began
in earnest under the Obama Administration. In 2013, the DOE launched
the Critical Materials Institute (“CMI”) at Ames Laboratory.239 In
connection with the launch, the DOE acknowledged that “many of the
fastest growing clean energy technologies, from batteries to solar panels,
are made with . . . [CM],” which “are essential to the clean energy
economy and are at risk for supply disruptions.”240 Research at the CMI
234. The SunShot Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/
eere/solar/sunshot-initiative [https://perma.cc/5MDK-QF8W] (last visited Oct.
23, 2020).
235. Id.
236. SunShot Initiative Awardees, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE
ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/sunshot-initiative-awardees [https://
perma.cc/9J45-XU84] (last visited Oct. 23, 2020).
237. Adam Wilson, The Future Looks Bright, or Does It? An Analysis of Solar
Energy Law and Policy in the United States, 22 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L.
333, 348–49 (2016) (Research focused on: (1) improving efficiencies and
reducing costs of photovoltaic and concentrating solar power technologies; (2)
increasing grid penetration through systems integration; (3) helping new
technologies get to market and become widely available, faster and more easily;
and (4) reducing the soft costs of solar deployment, such as permitting,
installation, and financing.).
238. The SunShot Initiative, supra note 234.
239. Increasing Access to Materials Critical to the Clean Energy Economy,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.energy.gov/articles/in
creasing-access-materials-critical-clean-energy-economy [https://perma.cc/LRG
5-Y7JT] (national laboratories, universities and industry make up the participants
in CM).
240. Id.
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has since focused on reducing CM in products and on developing
alternatives to CM.241 The CMI has already proven successful in multiple
ways. For instance, the Institute successfully produced phosphors for red
and green lights that use 90% less or no CM at all, developed magnets that
rely on cerium (a rare-earth element that is abundant and easy to obtain),
and discovered acid-free methods recycling of rare-earth elements that
eliminate significant environmental impacts.242 In all, the federally funded
CMI has generated more than 120 inventions related to reducing use of
CM in the past six years.243 Recognizing the Institute’s success, the DOE
opted to extend the project for another five years with an additional $125
million funding.244
Further increased funding to the CMI and comparable CM-related
federal research initiatives and specifying detailed goals in connection
with those initiatives could be a promising additional means of shoring up
the nation’s domestic CM supplies. For instance, the SunShot Initiative
had an explicit goal of reducing the cost of solar energy by 75%.245 Ideally,
the DOE would establish similar goals to help guide grant-funded research
into CM recycling and CM alternatives. Communicating clearer objectives
and providing more generous funding for such research grant programs
could be two additional means of ensuring that the nation continues to
have the CM supplies necessary to facilitate embracing more sustainable,
carbon-free energy technologies.
CONCLUSION
Maintaining reliable supplies of critical materials is an increasingly
important aspect of supporting the nation’s transition to a clean,
sustainable energy system. Fortunately, there are policy strategies capable
of addressing many of the obstacles and challenges that have historically
241. Id. (Additional research goals included determining what materials will
be important to clean energy technologies, creating new economically viable
processing technology to extract rare earth elements from ores, developing
material substitutes that are readily available for American manufacturers and
reducing the amount of critical material needed in clean energy technologies and
increase recycling and reuse.)
242. CRITICAL MATERIALS INST., ANNUAL REPORT — 2019, at 6 (2019),
https://iastate.app.box.com/s/kq1ider2rru6c69t4sw0q6aw438ez29r [https://perm
a.cc/MXA6-GG7R].
243. Id. at 12.
244. Increasing Access to Materials Critical to the Clean Energy Economy,
supra note 239.
245. Id.
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limited domestic supplies of CM. Specifically, the U.S. federal
government could greatly increase the nation’s investment in deep-sea
mining by acceding to UNCLOS and by developing a PEIS to shorten
permitting and leasing timelines. Congress and certain federal agencies
could also take numerous actions to strengthen the viability and growth of
the domestic CM recycling industry. Specifically, the federal government
could impose landfill bans for certain types of CM, create loan assistance
programs for developers of CM recycling facilities and products, enact
PTC and ITC programs to help recycled CM be more price-competitive
with virgin CM materials, and leverage the DoD’s purchasing power to
further increase demand for recycled CM. In addition, Congress could
increase federal funding for research grant programs focused on promoting
the development of alternative technologies for batteries, wind turbines,
solar panels and other types of renewable energy infrastructure that rely
less heavily on CM. By aggressively embracing these initiatives, the U.S.
is capable of finally stabilizing and shoring up its CM supplies, promoting
greater national security, and accelerating the nation’s adoption of carbonfree, renewable energy technologies.
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